These beliefs were articles of faith, based on a priori reasoning rather than on empirical evidence. Those like Berle and Means (1933) , March and Simon (1958), and Mariss (1964) who argued otherwise were given short shrift by the mainstream of the economics profession, as heretics who ill understood the basic tenets of the profession. To be sure, there were many aspects of economic behavior for which the standard model did remarkably weil: it could, for instance, accurately predict responses of input mixes to changes in factor prices, or the response of output to changes in prices. But there were other questions, including those raised by some of the institutional practices described below, to which the standard model provided no answer, or for which the answers that it did provide seemed wrong.
Fortunately, these views have changed markedly over the last 15 years. The easy confidence in the earlier dogma was disturbed by two events. First, the development of the new economics of information, stressing the fact that information is imperfect and costly, provided an intellectual foundation for the argument that managers had considerable discretion. The fundamental problem of owners of firms is how to motivate their managers to act in the interest of the owners. Today, this problem is referred to as the principal-agent problem. David Sappington provides an excellent overview, as well as further references, for the vast literature which has developed since the early contributions of Ross (1973) , Stiglitz (1974), and Jensen and Meckling (1976) .
The existence of imperfect information implied that managers might not (in general would not) maximize shareholder value, both because imperfect information gave managers discretion to pursue their own interests, which were often at odds with those of owners, and because the cost of obtaining and processing information meant that satisficing and rule-of-thumb strategies (March and Simon, 1958) would be followed.' A large literature developed detailing the limits of control on managers, including difficulties with share voting, with takeover mechanisms, and how good management has aspects of a public good (Demsetz, 1988; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Stiglitz, 1972a Stiglitz, , 1981 .
Secondly, these theoretical arguments were buttressed by increasing evidence that firms did not pursue shareholder interests. The most marked examples entailed firm behavior with respect to taxes and takeovers. Many corporations, perhaps most, did not seem to minimize total (corporate plus individual) tax liabilities (Stiglitz, 1973 (Stiglitz, , 1983 . Managers often resisted takeovers that would enhance shareholder value through poison pills and golden parachutes; managerial subversion of stockholder interest and managerial incompetence became epitomized in the cases of RJR Reynolds and Texaco; in the one case, the managers allegedly walked off with more than $100 milhon, in the other, a single miscalculated decision cost the firm billions of dollars. Furthermore, as described in the symposium in the Winter 1988 issue of this journal, many studies have found that firms undertaking hostile takeovers experience no increase in share value.
With these developments as a backdrop, the study of the economics of organizations has focused on several questions: What determines the boundary between organizations and markets? How does what happens within organizations differ from what happens between actors in markets? What determines the behavior of organizations? Are there ways of changing organizational design to make organizations more effective?
Ronald Coase (1937) provided the classic answer to the first two questions: markets and organizations differ in the manner in which transactions occur, and the boundary between the two is determined so as to minimize transactions costs. Transactions costs theory has provided a rich explanation of the changing boundaries between organizations and markets, but like the typical stock market analyst, it perhaps does better on Monday morning quarterbacking than as a tool of prediction. In his essay in this symposium, Herbert Simon argues that the economy is in an essentially neutral equilibrium between organizations and markets, implying that seemingly large changes in the mix between markets and organizations might result in little change in efficiency. From this perspective, one decade might see the formation of conglomerates, another their breakup, but economists should not expect that such shifts in the boundary between firms and markets are symptoms of fundamental changes in transactions costs or other technologies.
Part of the reason that Simon holds his position is that he sees less difference between markets and organizations, at least in some respects, than is traditional among economists. The traditional caricature had relations within markets regulated by prices, while relations within organizations were regulated by quantities or commands. But this view vastly oversimplified both markets and organizations. Organizations rely on commands only to a limited extent; Simon's paper in this symposium discusses how they use authority, rewards, and identification to motivate workers, while Sappington's contribution describes how firms design incentive schemes which are a far departure from traditional price mechanisms. Further, markets rely on prices to only a limited extent; quantities like sales and size of inventories are as important as prices in determining corporate behavior. Market relations among firms are governed not just by prices, but by contracts, contracts which in many ways appear similar to those between a firm and its workers.
The problems posed by the boundary of the firm were most fully articulated in the context of the debate over vertical integration: while some .economists argued that vertical integration allowed firms to internalize externalities or resolve certain "command" problems-ensuring, for instance, the downstream firm that supplies would be forthcoming-others argued that integration never should make much difference. Whether in integrated or uiiietegrated firms, decisions are made by managers, and whatever incentive scheme was employed in the integrated firm could have been employed before integration, with contracts ensuring specified payments in different contingencies from one establishment to another. From this perspective, there appears no convincing argument for integration.
The argument cuts the other way, as well. In Stiglitz (1989b) , I have described what 1 call the "centralization paradox." Since a centralized organization can do anything that a decentralized organization can-it can even choose to decentralize, if it wishes-but the converse is not true, shouldn't centralization be a dominant form of organization?
Recent research on these issues begins with the premise of incomplete contracts: with complete contracts, all contingencies are taken care of, and it makes little difference whether the transaction occurs within a firm or between firms.
One view emphasizes that incomplete contracts must provide for the allocation of residual rights. What happens when an unspecified event occurs? Who has the right to take what actions? Just as traditional theory emphasized the "residual" rights to profits that were vested in the ownership of firms, the more recent theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986) has emphasized the residual rights of control that are vested in ownership. In this view, vertical integration changes who has residual rights of control. Of course, while the owners ofthe firm have residual control over capital, workers have residual control over their labor, and a firm can be viewed as a partnership between these (and other) factors of production. Accordingly, residual control is not cleanly assigned, and unanticipated events will lead to bargaining.Â second answer to the issue of why markets and organizations are not functionally identical emphasizes that unforeseen contingencies provide different incentives to various parties to take actions; however, the costs and benefits of taking actions (and therefore the actions which will occur) may be affected by the organizational structure. For instance, consider the problem of intervention in the event of a loss by a production unit. When the production unit is a subsidiary of a larger firm (which, accordingly, will bear its losses), then the larger firm has a strong incentive to intervene and the costs of such intervention are relatively low. Contrast this with what happens if the smaller production unit is free-standing. The costs of the larger unit intervening are larger. It could intervene, but it would have first to buy up a majority of shares in the thai this view ofthe firm as a partnership is somewhat different from the " principai-agent" view described by Sappington in this issue. Still a third view sees the managers at the center of the firm; they are the agents, but there are multiple principals, like workers (the union), suppliers of equity, banks, and so on. The firm is thus viewed as a multiple principaKinultiple) agent problem (StigBtz, 1985; Stole, 1990 ).
smaller unit, take control of the board of directors, and use its control of the board of directors as the basis of intervention. .411 of this takes time, making the benehts of intervention smaller. Accordingly, when the production unit is free-standing, there is an effective commitment by the larger firm not to intervene. Note that these statements may be valid even though the shareholders of the smaller production unit are the same as those of the larger unit. Thus, those who ultimately bear the losses are the same, and "nominal control" (which resides in shareholders) is the same.^ ln this way, organizational form (including what Williamson (1979) refers to as the "rules of governance") can be viewed as forms of making commitments. Even with the possibilities of last-minute renegotiation and broken contracts, commitments do make a difference.''
Economists have come to realize that the question of the boundary of the firm need not coincide with the perhaps more fundamental question of centralization and decentralization. There might be a single firm in the economy (whatever is meant by the concept of a "firm") yet that firm could be organized in a decentralized manner. Moreover, an organization may be decentralized with respect to some activities, and not with respect to others.
Centralization vs. Decentralization
The advantages (and occasionally the disadvantages) of decentralization have long been a major theme of economic analysis. In particular, the Austrian tradition emphasized the decentralized nature of knowledge in society (Hayek, 1945) , and the Arrow-Debreu model was often touted as estabhshing the efficiency of decentralized mechanisms. However, few have formally attempted to compare centralized and decentralized systems, including their ability to acquire and respond to new information.' The paper by Raaj Sah in this symposium describes some recent work which explicitly recognizes that each of the units within an organization have limited information; it is costly for them to acquire information; and communication between units is costly, limited, and imperfect. Thus, human fallibility may lead units to make mistakes. The structure of decision-making-for example, polyarchies, hierarchies or committees operating under various rules-affects the likelihood that good projects get rejected or bad projects get approved, and the costs (including the costs of 3-T-l This perspective has been applied to the inlerpretation of the difference between privatization, regulation, and nationalization of, say, utilities, where the eventual "shareholders" are citizens of the country or the state. See Sappington and and the paper by Vickers in this issue. ''One early example of how commitments can make a difference is from the industrial organizational literature, ln models with spatial competition, it would pay a monopolist with many stores to set up those stores as iodependent franchises; the organizational form served as an effective commitment to respond lo entrants in such a way as to deter entry more effectively (Stiglitz, 1986a ). Two such attempts should be noted. Marschak and Radner's (1972) "theory of teams" and Hurwicz's work both spawned large literatures. delays) associated with deciding at all. Work along these lines sets out to delineate the circumstances under which decentralized (or centralized) decision making has decided advantages.
Another strand of recent research has emphasized that decentralization with many units engaged in roughly similar activities has an important informational advantage: it provides information which would not otherwise be available, a basis of comparison that is useful for selecting those who are good at the particular tasks and for providing incentives. This form of competition, markedly different from that envisaged in the traditional Arrow-Debreu model and much closer to that seen in modern industrial economies between firms, has decided efficiency benefits."
A Closer Look at Internal Organization
There is more to organizational structure than just centralization and decentralization. The firm has to decide how to motivate workers and how to arrange the production process. The interests of the managers and workers of a firm seldom coincide exactly witb that ofthe firms' owners, and the presence of imperfect and costly information allows managers and workers some discretion to pursue their own interests. The old adage that "if you want something done right, do it yourself may reflect divergences in interests as much as it does differences in competencies. But careful attention to the compensation structure of workers and nianagers can make the interests of " principal" and "agent" coincide better. Sappington's paper in this issue provides an insightful discussion of how this can most effectively be done, and of why it is that, as much as one tries, divergences remain.
Much of the work discussed by Sappington involves fairly simple organizations: a manager with several employees. But of course, modern corporations involve managers managing managers managing managers... managing workers. This multi-tiered layered structure involves a host of new problems. For instance, one has to be sure that the supervisors, instead of managing the workers in the interests ofthe owner, do not collude with workers "against" the owner (Tirole, 1986) . The limited information of upper level bosses about Sappington discusses this information advantage in this issue and provides some citations. For an application to R&D, see Stiglitz (1986b) .
This brief discussion of recent strands of research on centralization versus decentralization is by no means complete. One strand of literature has focused on consequences for the variability of organizational performance and the effectiveness of evolutionary processes Stigiitz, 1985, 1991) ; another strand focuses on the relative speeds of action (Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1988; Bolton and Farrell, 1990; Stiglitz, 1989a, b) ; still another strand, growing out ofthe team theory literature (Marschak and Radner, 1972) focuses on the costs of communication.
worker activities may make systems where workers are provided with an incentive to monitor their peers particularly attractive. ' On one side, limited information and incomplete contracting necessitate vesting managers with discretion; on the other, they also provide managers with an ability to use their discretionary power to entrench themselves and to acquire rents (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988) . Hannaway (1989) has argued that much of managerial activity is in fact of this form.
Since early discussions of principal-agent and moral hazard problems (Stiglitz, 1974) , attention has been drawn to two complementary control mechanisms: supervision (or monitoring input), and incentive pay basing pay on observed performance. One problem with just observing output, as in a piece rate system, is to ensure quality (Stiglitz, 1975) . More generally, the problem is that only some attributes of output can be measured accurately or at all If those attributes cannot be measured accurately, having pay depend on them will force workers to bear possibly large risk. But if pay does not depend much on those attributes, workers' attention will be diverted towards those attributes which are highly rewarded, perhaps resulting in quantity over quality. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) have recently suggested that these considerations (among others) may be important in job design, in the division of tasks among different individuals. If some important tasks where performance can be accurately measured can be separated out, there can be gains from turning those tasks into separate jobs and thus allowing high-powered incentive schemes to be used.
The Power and Limits of Standard Economic Analysis
The literature on the economics of organizations has been a powerful one, both providing theoretical insights into the merits of alternative organizational structures, and also explaining a variety of institutions in the economy. Edward Lazear, in his paper in this symposium, illustrates this point by showing how such phenomena as mandatory retirement, upward-sloping wage profiles, and huge salary differentials between corporate presidents and vice-presidents can be explained by the incentives paradigm.
Yet, many predictions of the incentives paradigm do not seem to be borne out. Even in highly specialized cases, it can take considerable skill to derive the formula for the optimal incentive scheme; perhaps not surprisingly, observed incentive structures look little like those predicted by tbe theory, nor do they change in response to the kinds of changes that the theory would have !\rnott and Stiglitz (1991) provides an analysis of peer monitoring in the context of insurance markets, while Stiglitz, (1990) pro\-ides an analysis of peer monitoring in credit markets. predicted. Piece rates are seldom an important component of compensation; when they are used, linear piece rate systems are prevalent, even though these are only opdmal when utility functions display the particular (and peculiar) property of constant ahsolute risk aversion (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) .** In the one area where piece rates are prevalent, agricultural sharecropping, the fraction of output going to the worker remains unchanged over long periods of time, and across crops with quite different properties.
The output-related incentives provided to senior management in large corporations-that is, the fraction of the incremental output which accrues to them-seem too weak to align their economic incentives with those of owners. The form those incentives take (usually stock options) appear inefficient both with respect to risk-hearing and tax burden . Thus, the incentives paradigm can neither explain the structure of observed incentive schemes nor what it is that motivates managers and workers.
If economists want to understand what makes managers work and what differentiates successflil from unsuccessful organizations, we may need to look beyond the compensation schemes and the economists' standard incentives paradigm. In this symposium, the papers by Lazear and Simon explore these possibilities. Lazear shows how insights of psychology may help us understand the details of labor contracts. Simon argues persuasively that in successful organizations, workers identify with the organizations' objective; that they take on the organizations' objective as their Ĉ oncluding Remarks
To those who manage firms and actually organize the production which occurs in the economy, the perspectives on economic organization provided in this symposium may seem obvious. For the received wisdom of economics, however, these commonsensical insights should be troubling, since the premises on which these analyses are based and many of the conclusions which they reach are greatly at variance with traditional neoclassical analysis. To those who rely on some version of the perfect markets Arrow-Dehreu paradigm, the perspectives on the economics of organizations presented in this symposium must either be wrong, or else be of secondary (or tertiary) importance-no more than window dressing on a basically accurate model of the economy.
The perspectives presented here do not question all the insights of traditional price theory. Whether managers do or do not have a great deal of discretion to pursue their own interests will not alter conclusions such as that at higher output prices, firms will normally produce more, or at higher wage Among the peculiar properties of this utility function is that the wealth elasticity of risky assets is zero. These properties make it unsuitable as a basis of any descriptive theory. A similar argument has been put forward by George Akerlof (1991).
rates, firms will conserve on their use of labor. But they do alter our views about whether markets are necessarily efficient, and about many policies, including those pertaining to takeovers. They may help economists understand and improve upon a variety of observed management practices, including the devices firms use to motivate and retain workers.
At the very least, this symposium and the literature on the economics of organizations have opened up a new set of questions. They look inside the black box of the firm. And that look inside is disquieting: One of the foundations ofthe neoclassical theory has been shaken. How much ofthe superstructure will have to be reconstructed remains to be seen.
